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Abstract
This paper presents the theoretical and practical
beneﬁts from a case study using a the Architecture
Business Cycle to understand the management of
software architecture at an automotive manufacturer.
The study was done to prepare for architectural
changes driven by new technology and in the
automotive business environment.
Our results show that the architecture business cycle
worked well in deﬁning the theoretical context for the
study after some modiﬁcations; the architecture had to
be precisely deﬁned in the interview situation to gain
more useful data rather than broad generalisations.
Further contributions of the study were a deeper
understanding of role of the architecture and it’s
position among other artefacts in the organisation,
and an increased focus on architectural issues in
management meetings. The study also indirectly
affected a subsequent re-organisation.
1. Introduction
As all other car manufacturers, Volvo Car
Corporation (VCC) is facing tough times and there
is a strong demand to develop in-vehicle software
with shorter lead times and improved quality. Several
authors have identiﬁed that one key element to
accomplish this, as well as handle the increasing
complexity that follows the ever-increasing feature
content, lays in the establishment of a software
architecture [1]–[4]. For example, Broy states “The
enormous complexity of software in cars asks for an
appropriate structuring by architectures in layers and
levels of abstraction” [3]. But not just any architecture
will meet the challenges described, the architecture in
question must address the relevant business forces and
the architecture must actually be used as a guide for
the software development in the organisation.
The ﬁrst step towards improvement in working with
architecture in an organisation is to capture the present
situation, i.e. to identify the actual forces shaping the
architecture, how well the architecture is used, and
if the architecture actually helps in addressing the
present challenges. In this particular case we wanted
to capture how the Electronic and Electric Systems
Engineering (EESE) unit at Volvo Cars viewed the
present software architecture, originating from 1998,
and how the architecture affected the work of the
developers within the unit. Of particular interest to the
architect running the study were the business forces
and feedbacks involved in eventual implicit decisions
concerning the architecture and how homogeneous
the view on software architecture was among people
working at the EESE unit.
In order to get that understanding, we performed
the case study presented in this article. We choose
to base the case study on the Architecture Business
Cycle, originally presented by Bass et al [5], with the
goal this would help identify potential areas for future
study and improvement when developing software. As
a side beneﬁt we also draw some conclusions about the
applicability of using the architecture business cycle to
understand the role of 3 partial scenarios of a software
architecture in the automotive industry in practice.
The contributions from this study are a procedure to
capture an instance of the general architecture business
cycle [5]–[7], with some modiﬁcations to the cycle
to keep a manageable scope of our study, and the
conclusion that the architecture business cycle works
well as a theoretical framework for practical studies.
We ﬁnd the main contribution to be a rich empirical
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insight in the role of software architecture in the
automotive industry through the theoretical lens of the
architecture business cycle.
Finally, the study contributes with a deeper
understanding for the studied organisation of the role
of the architecture and it’s position among other
artefacts, and an increased focus on architectural issues
in management meetings.
2. Background
2.1. Software in Automotive Systems
A modern high-end car is an embedded software
system consisting of 30-70 different Electronic Control
Units (ECUs), each with a microprocessor1 executing
in the order of 1 MByte compiled code. All software in
the vehicle is deployed to these ECUs and they control
the behaviour of virtually all electrical functions, from
power windows to valve timing of the engine.
The in-vehicle software executing on the ECUs
share a number of characteristics common to the
automotive domain (see e.g. [2] and [3] for further
elaboration):
• A large number of variants and conﬁgurations
(often several brands sharing common platforms)
• Highly distributed real-time system
• Distributed development at vehicle manufacturers
and suppliers
• Low product cost margins
• Stringent dependability requirements
This combination of characteristics together with a
steady growth of features realised by electronics and
software, makes the electrical system in a vehicle
a highly complex software system, even though the
amount of compiled code is smaller than in many other
business domains.
2.2. The Architecture Business Cycle
According to Bass et al. the model of the
architecture business cycle (ABC) is based on the
assumption that “software architecture is the result
of technical, business and social inﬂuences”. The
resulting architecture “in turn affects the technical,
business and social environments” [5]. The key
elements of the cycle are the forces inﬂuencing
the architecture, the requirements that result from
these forces, the architect and his experience, the
architecture and the system (or systems in a product
1. A few safety-critical ECUs have two microprocessors for
redundancy or internal monitoring.
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Figure 1. The architecture business cycle as
deﬁned by Kazman et al. [7].
line architecture). The architecture business cycle also
shows how these key elements inﬂuence each other,
seen in Figure 1. In a later report the originators
clariﬁed the purpose; “. . . the architecture business
cycle was envisioned as a means to depict the
inﬂuences on a software architect and to show how
architectures can eventually inﬂuence the very things
that originally shaped them” [6].
The inﬂuences of the original cycle have been
updated by the original authors in [6] and are
subsequently called forces in [7]. This study is based
on the latest of these updated architecture business
cycles, since the seven categories of forces, seen in
Figure 1, shaping the architecture was easier to relate
to the interview responses.
The main idea of the cycle, that the architecture
provides feedback in turn affecting one or more of
the original inﬂuences or forces, have remained the
same through all evolutions of the the architecture
business cycle. The cycle is often used as a theoretical
framework, e.g. in textbooks [5], [8], but it is hard to
ﬁnd empirical studies involving the actual stakeholders
and not only as an observation of an architecture
business cycle from a distance.
2.3. Automotive Software Development at
Volvo Car Corporation
The Electronic and Electric Systems Engineering
(EESE) unit is responsible for deﬁning the software
requirements for the in-vehicle software for all Volvo
cars. The EESE unit is one of ﬁve units within Product
Development at VCC. In most cases the coding of
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the software is outsourced and written by suppliers,
a practice very common in the automotive industry,
but some parts of the code is also written in-house or
auto-coded from models. The software development
process at the EESE unit includes everything from
collecting or deﬁning vehicle level use cases down to
allocating speciﬁc requirements to software deployed
to certain Electronic Control Units (ECUs). The ECU
software requirements details for example interfaces,
state machines and/or control algorithms.
The EESE unit is also responsible for deﬁning the
architecture of the electrical system, both hardware and
software. This includes enabling the quality attributes
in the architecture necessary to achieve the business
goals of the product development organisation.
2.4. Studied Subset of the Software
Architecture
The architecture studied dates back to the ﬁrst
Volvo S80, launched in 1998. Obviously the software
in present vehicles is not identical to that car, but
many of the fundamental architectural strategies and
views are still the same as when they were deﬁned
in 1995-98. We limited the scope of our study to a
subset of the entire software architecture, described as
three scenarios resulting from architecture decisions
affecting virtually all in-vehicle software developed
at the EESE unit, regardless if the code was written
in-house or by suppliers. These scenarios are mostly
unchanged in the ten years between when the ﬁrst
architectural decisions were made and when the study
was conducted, even if updates have been necessitated
by added functional content, legal requirements, etc.
In our study the selection of what scenarios to
include was made according to four basic criteria:
• The scenario should be well-known by all
developers and not need signiﬁcant explanations
in order to be studied.
• The scenario should not be excessively
complicated to grasp.
• The scenario should be non-trivial, i.e. the
captured cycles should be representative for the
theory behind the architecture business cycle.
• The scenario should affect the development and
design of software at the EESE unit (some
architectural decisions mostly affects hardware,
such as physical routing of the cable harness) .
The selection of scenarios was then made by an
architect at Volvo Cars based on his “inside” perception
of what subset of the architecture would be interesting
to understand more in-depth. Of particular interest to
the architect were scenarios resulting from eventual
implicit decisions concerning the architecture. A
second goal for the architect was to suggest a subset
that were the result of architecture decisions that are
likely to be affected by the future introduction of
the AUTOSAR standardised software architecture [9].
Based on this the study focused on three architectural
scenarios:
S1) Network topology of the in-vehicle multiplexed
communication networks.
S2) Handling of software variants in production.
S3) Split of development responsibility among teams
at the EESE unit.
2.4.1. Network Topology. The ECUs in a Volvo
vehicle, and the software that runs on them, exchange
information via a number of multiplexed network buses
to enable functions that would not have been possible
otherwise or overly costly if not being distributed.
Almost all ECUs have a number of sensors and
actuators connected to them depending on purpose and
location, and these can be shared among distributed
functions. The communication buses that exchange
information between these ECUs are typically 2-4
CAN buses, 1 optical MOST bus and a number of
LIN sub-buses.
Controller Area network (CAN), Local Interconnect
Network (LIN) and Media Oriented Systems Transport
(MOST) are all de-facto standards in tthe automotive
industry, each having a different balance between
cost versus bandwidth and dependability. CAN [10]
and LIN [11] are twisted-pair and single copper
wires respectively, while MOST [12] is an optical
ﬁbre for interconnecting multimedia components. All
Volvo CAN and MOST connected ECUs are re-
programmable, i.e. has ﬂash memory and not ROM,
which allows programming both in the manufacturing
plant as well as at dealers and workshops after delivery
to the end-user.
A multiplexed network topology was a major change
for Volvo Cars when the decisions were made leading
to the topology seen in Figure 2. At that time, 1998,
only a few high-end cars had distributed system based
on multiplex networks and the most common solution
among vehicle manufacturers was to have point-to-
point communication on dedicated wires between
ECUs that needed to exchange information.
The layout of which ECUs are connected to which
bus and what ECUs are acting as communication
gateways between the buses is the network topology
of a vehicle, of which the Volvo XC90 shown in
Figure 2 is a representative example. Compared to
other similar competitor vehicles designed at the same
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Figure 2. The network topology of a Volvo XC90.
The ECUs connected to CAN and MOST and
the main multiplexed networks are seen in their
approximate physical location.
time the number CAN buses are usually lower in a
Volvo vehicle, integrating all powertrain and chassis
ECUs on one CAN bus and all comfort and body
functions on another.
2.4.2. Software Variant Handling. The architecture
prescribes two main strategies on how to support
vehicles built to order with all the thousands of
variants this means. The ﬁrst solution is to handle
software articles the same way as nuts and bolts in
manufacturing, i.e. with separate article numbers for
ECU software and hardware in the manufacturing
system. Before this was introduced in 1998 all ECUs
with both hardware and software were considered a
single article, and the software were mostly stored in
ROM, i.e. there was no possibility to update or change
the software without changing the hardware.
The second solution for handling variants of the
software on ECU level is using adaptation during start-
up [13], i.e. when the ECU is powered it receives
conﬁguration parameters from a centralised stored
parameter ﬁle over the vehicle networks. In some cases
an ECU can in addition to the central parameters also
have a local conﬁguration ﬁle, which in this case is also
having a separate article number in manufacturing.
2.4.3. Development Responsibility. The development
responsibility at the EESE unit is typically assigned
to teams according to end user functions, or grouping
of functions. A example of development responsibility
would be for locking functions, including central
locking, double lock and child-blocked door. The
teams are part of the line organisation at the EESE
unit, i.e. the development responsibility does not
vary a lot between different vehicle projects. These
end user functions can span over several ECUs,
and the development responsibility for the physical
components (e.g. ECUs, sensors and actuators) are
Table 1. Interviewees at Volvo Car Corporation.
Role Years at VCC
1 Project manager 5
2 Function designer 2 Consultant
3 System designer 3 Consultant
4 System designer 6.5 Consultant
5 Programmer 10
6 Tester 5 Consultant
7 Tester 2
8 Domain expert 18
9 Function designer 1 Consultant
10 Domain expert 7
11 Component Designer 25
12 Line manager 24
13 Quality Assurance Staff 15
14 Project manager 6
15 Architect 1.5 Consultant
16 Tester 10
17 Architect 7
18 Component designer 2
19 Line manager 7.5
20 Line manager 11
usually assigned to the same line organisation that
are most strongly involved in deﬁning the functional
requirements on that component. Some support
functions, not visible to the end-user, are handled in
the same way, examples of these could be vehicle
diagnostics, electrical energy management, etc.
3. The Case Study
In the course of the study 20 persons were
interviewed, which were selected as a purposive
sample [14] in order to cover a comprehensive
variety of roles and teams at EESE unit. We
selected the interviewees to cover all roles of those
that develop, deliver and maintain the system that
is, all developer stakeholders according to IEEE
Standard 1471. More speciﬁcally we aimed to have
at least one interviewee each of “architects, designers,
programmers, maintainers, testers, domain engineers,
quality assurance staff, conﬁguration management
staff, suppliers and project managers or developers”
[15]. The 20 interviewees who participated in the study
are seen in Table 1.
The interviews were semi-structured with open-
ended questions and started with some introductory
questions to get some background about the
respondent, like present role in the organisation,
time employed at Volvo Cars, and a general idea of
how the respondent viewed software at the EESE unit.
Then the three architectural scenarios were brieﬂy
described to achieve a mutual agreement of what
subset of the architecture was included in the scope
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of study. The scenarios discussed in the interviews
were chosen so they would allow the respondents to
present their view of forces and feedback based on
their understanding. The majority of each interview
was based on a set of questions (Table 2) directed
at exploring the respondents view of the architecture
business cycle without necessitating an explanation
of the theory behind the cycle. The questions were
originally published in [16].
The interviews were performed by three students
from the IT University of Go¨teborg, minimising bias in
the interview situation by having an interviewer with
a preconceived understanding of the current situation
at Volvo Cars. This also eliminated any personal bias
during the interview situation if the interviewer would
have been previously known to the interviewees or
would have worked together with them. The students
performed and transcribed the interviews as part of
their ﬁnal project towards their bachelor’s degree in
Software Engineering and Management [16].
We used the theory of the architecture business cycle
in our case study “as an initial guide to design and data
collection” [17]. Our main goal with the study was
neither to validate nor to redeﬁne the existing theory
behind the architecture business cycle. Our intent was
to do an exploratory case study [18] in order to better
understand how the EESE unit viewed the software
architecture and how the architecture affected the work
of the developers at this organisation.
3.1. Adaptation of the Interview Strategy
One dry-run interview was performed initially which
was not included in the data. The sole purpose
of this interview was to test the feasibility of
the interview strategy and the questions and the
data from this respondent was not included in the
results. The interview result of this dry-run did not
capture much useful knowledge for Volvo Cars. The
forces identiﬁed were very general and basically only
mimicked the general architecture business cycle as
described by the original authors (Figure 1). These
ﬁndings lead us to re-evaluate our interview design
from general questions about software architecture
to speciﬁc questions about the three signiﬁcant
automotive architecture scenarios in Section 2.4. The
change in interview design was necessary since
we judged this the most efﬁcient way to keep a
manageable scope of the study with the resources
and time available, rather than elaborating with an
interview design to cover the entire architecture. This
change meant we gained a detailed insight in some
parts of the architecture at the expense of coverage.
Table 2. In-depth questions to identify the
architecture business cycle for the architecture
scenarios [S1/S2/S3]. The questions were
repeated for each of the three scenarios.
# Question Purpose
1 Could you, brieﬂy, tell us
about the architecture for
[SCENARIO] from your
own perspective?
Understand how the
respondent sees the
realisation of the
architecture. Build a
foundation to base the next
questions on.
2 What do you think
inﬂuenced the architect to
structure the architecture
in that particular
way? Persons, Roles?
Techniques, Documents,
Standards, Laws, Business
Goals, Competition,
Lifecycle Issues?
Gain knowledge of
what the respondent
thinks inﬂuences the
architecture. Categorise in
the following 7+2 force
categories: Stakeholder
Needs, Business
Management Issues,
Legal/Contractual Issues,
Commercial/Competitive
Pressures, Technical
Environment, Political
Issues and Lifecycle
Issues, Developing
Organisation and Legacy.
3 Do you normally
consider “Non-functional
requirements” or “Quality
attributes”(QA) in your
work? If so, which ones
are the most important for
you for [SCENARIO]?
What kind of trade-offs
among QA’s does the
architecture exhibit?
First of all, realise if the
respondent uses/thinks of
quality attributes at all
when working, see if they
are related to software
engineering and not only
hardware speciﬁc. See
which QA’s are the most
important and how they
conﬂict/relate.
4 Do you know who or
which group of architects
created the architecture for
[SCENARIO]? How did
their previous knowledge
and experience affect the
outcome?
Map the force category:
“Architect’s experience”
5 In which ways do you
think the inﬂuences have
been realised in the
actual architecture for
[SCENARIO]?
Find out about concepts,
strategies, patterns, or
the respondents lack of
knowledge of them.
6 Have you ever reﬂected
over how the architecture
of [SCENARIO] or the
system has inﬂuenced
your role at VCC? Your
group’s role? The entire
organisation in any way?
Map the force-feedback
of the cycle, see how the
inﬂuences that inﬂuenced
the architecture are
affected.
3.2. Data Collection
The interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded
by looking for statements related to the forces,
architecture and feedbacks according to the general
architecture business cycle. The data after transcribing
and coding the 20 interviews are 60 diagrams each
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Figure 3. The architecture business cycle for
software variant handling according to one of the
interviewed component designers. Figure adapted
from [16].
showing an instance of the general architecture
business cycle for a scenario. An example of such
a diagram for the software variant handling scenario
from one of the developers can be seen in seen
in Figure 3. Each of the 20 respondents’ opinions
were captured with one diagram for each of the three
scenarios studied.
The subsequent coding of the data to a
comprehensive cycle for each of the three scenarios
was done by grouping similar recorded quotes
together into categories. The categories emerged
when examining and comparing the data from the
individual interviews. The categories found could then
be assigned to a single force or feedback according
to the general architecture business cycle. An excerpt
of this categorisation is seen in Figure 4. This coding
made it possible to build up a comprehensive cycle for
the three architecture scenarios based on the merged
information from all 20 respondents. The coding was
done by three different persons, depending on the
scenario being studied due to practical reasons, but
the same person coded all responses regarding the
same scenario to ensure consistency.
4. Results
Figure 3 shows an example of the data resulting
from one of the interviews, in this case a component
designer’s view of the cycle for software variant
handling. This cycle could be seen as a little
“thin”, he only mentioned one single explicit quality
Stakeholder needs
Positive effect on the
development process
Can easier fix
H/W problems
Facilitates dev/test
Affects the manufacturing
process
Need to manage
compatible versions
Work becomes hard if
parameters are wrong
Business management
Reusability
Possibility of
reusing code
Possibility of reusing
requirements
Sourcing
Suppliers need to
be familiar with
adaptation
during start-up
Respondent  #1
Domain expert
7 yrs
Respondent  #2
Component designer
25 yrs
Respondent  #3
Component designer
2 yrs
Respondent  #4
Tester
2 yrs
Figure 4. Example of how statements from some
of the respondents are categorised and then
sorted under the seven forces in the architecture
business cycle.
attribute requirement, cost, which in his experience
inﬂuenced the architecture. This respondent’s view
of the cycle only had forces regarding stakeholder
needs, and commercial/competitive pressures while the
feedback in the cycle was thought to affect business
management. While other respondents were not as
extreme in their reﬂections, cost was clearly on of the
main forces mentioned in all interviews. A broader
view of the architecture business cycle from the
viewpoint of a section manager with 24 years of
experience at Volvo Cars can be seen in Figure 5.
We note also in this cycle only quality attributes were
listed as explicit requirements to the architecture and
our conclusion is that the subset of the architecture
studied is mostly driven by quality attributes rather
than functional or business requirements.
The original architects responsible were not included
in the study due to practical reasons, the architectural
decisions were made ten years prior to the study,
but a summary from one of the original architects
can be found in [19]. Considering our focus was
not to timeline what decisions had led to the current
architecture, we do not perceive this omission to be
problematic. Instead we were looking to capture the
current view of the architecture business cycle for our
three scenarios.
4.1. Disagreement on Development
Responsibility
The more visible the results of architecture decisions
were in the actual system and component design, the
more agreement between the interviewed stakeholders
there was in how the cycle looked like for that the
scenario. For the abstract decisions leading to design
96 2009 IEEE/IFIP WICSA/ECSA
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Figure 5. The architecture business cycle
for network topology according to one of the
interviewed line managers. Figure adapted from
[16].
responsibility (where we could ﬁnd no underlying
conceptual principle) there was no overall agreement
on the cycle. On one end there was a set of
respondents saying the architect was in full control
of the architectural decision, while on the other end
respondents said the architect was largely bypassed
and the feedback in the cycle counteracted the
original forces. Figure 6 shows some details of the
business cycle according to the latter respondents2.
An interpretation of the latter respondents is that the
development responsibility was perceived as an meta-
level constraint to the architecture and not a decision
possible for the architects to make, or at best an
implicit architectural decision. The organisation of
domain experts on brakes, climate, locking and other
customer functions into separate groups together with
respective hardware and software developers could be
seen as a natural from an management viewpoint, while
an architect could conceive it as a constraint.
4.2. Counteracting Feedbacks in the Captured
Business Cycles
Our study revealed examples where an architecture
decision actually counteracted the initial forces leading
to the decision. For example, it was considered
time consuming to request a new or changed global
2. Some forces and feedbacks have been left out due to intellectual
property rights of Volvo Cars, but those listed still illustrate the
implicit effects on the business cycle from this scenario.
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Figure 6. The architecture business cycle for the
split of development responsibility based on the
set of respondents which thought the architect was
bypassed in the cycle. The ﬁgure highlights where
some of the feedback in the cycle counteracts the
original forces. Figure adapted from [16].
parameter used for the adaptation during start-up.
Another example, from Figure 6, is where one
of the needs was to “facilitate and simplify the
working method” while the split of development
responsibility has lead to “monster documentation”.
There was a clear “will to outsource the development
of components” (i.e. ECUs) but in practice it was
“hard to coordinate the suppliers” with the present
deployment of functionality onto ECUs.
Since our study was a snapshot in time of the cycle
we have not evaluated if these counteracting feedbacks
have affected a change in the originating forces for the
next generation architectures developed at EESE, as is
explained by the theory in [5], but we are looking to
explore this aspect in future work.
4.3. Role of the Architect at the EESE Unit
To capture the beneﬁts for the organisation
participating in the study we interviewed the Senior
Manager for Electrical Architecture, a section within
the EESE unit, who sponsored the original case study.
This interview was made approximately 1 1/2 year
after the original study took place and looked to
capture the lasting effects of the initial study. The
manager reﬂects on how the respondents at EESE
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unit showed a discrepancy in perceptions of the role
architecture and architect plays:
“Where primarily management viewed
architects to be the main contributors to
early prerequisites of design work and
limiting the number of design alternatives
down-streams [later in the development
work], the architects themselves found their
role to be more reactive and victimized of
decisions taken elsewhere.”
This difference in views was only captured since
from looking at such a variety of roles among
the respondents, and was a major ﬁnding for the
organisation. The manager continues and clearly ﬁnds
major beneﬁts for the EESE unit as a whole from the
participating in the case study:
“The study was an eye opener for the
organisation that the architecture team may
be under-utilized, which has since led to
greater focus on strategic architectural issues
in management team meetings. The study
itself is no longer referred to, but acted as
the initiator of the discussion.”
When asked speciﬁcally about possible impacts the
study have has on processes, artefacts or organisation
he answers:
“There has been a major reorganisation
within EESE since the study was conducted
and the study inﬂuenced that activity
indirectly, resulting in co-organisation of
architecture related disciplines into the
Electrical Systems Design department.”
This quote goes one step further by illustrating the
impact the case study has as initiator for one of the
goals in the re-organisation of the EESE unit—a re-
organisation that resulted in strengthening the role
and impact of architecture by deﬁning a department
dedicated to this. The initial study, and in particular the
development responsibility scenario, played a role as
one of several triggers for understanding and change.
4.4. Reﬂections on the Architecture Business
Cycle
In our study we aimed to capture an instance of
the architecture business cycle for the comprehensive
software architecture in a modern vehicle, but our dry-
run interview did not reveal much information useful
to Volvo Cars beyond what was already described in
the general architecture business cycle [6].
In the study we therefore focused on a subset of the
architecture and as a result captured a separate cycle
for each of three architecture scenarios. Our conclusion
is that each architecture scenario in itself had a set of
forces and feedback according to the theory behind the
general architecture business cycle.
4.4.1. Difﬁculties in Capturing the Cycle. The
interview responses for one of the architectural
scenarios investigated varied too much to be captured
in a single diagram of a cycle. We are at this time
hesitant to conclude if this means the theory of
the architecture business cycle needs to be expanded
or if our methodology to capture the cycle must
be improved to resolve ambiguities. We can think
of three possible explanations why we could not
capture a single architecture business cycle for the last
architecture scenario:
1) The captured architecture business cycle is
very dependent on the respondent, or set of
respondents.
2) It is an inherent fact that the results from
some decisions are not easily captured in single
diagram of an architecture business cycle.
3) The particular decisions leading to the scenario
for which we could not capture capture a
coherent cycle, did not involve the architect
(or the architecture), at least according to some
respondents.
It was not possible for us to determine the exact cause
of why it was so difﬁcult to capture a coherent cycle for
the last scenario of development responsibility, as this
would have required an extended study and additional
run of interviews.
4.4.2. Additional Forces. In the course of the
interviews some of the respondents mentioned forces
inﬂuencing the architect and the architecture not
readily categorised according to the general forces of
the architecture business cycle in [7]. The students
who performed the interviews suggested two additional
categories of forces: Developing Organisation and
Legacy, besides the seven forces proposed in [7]. We
agree with this analysis and note that the development
organisation category can be seen as a result of
Conway’s law [20]. The development responsibility
is likely shaped by the existing organisation, where
different teams have their areas of expertise, and not
only by the other seven forces. Legacy is the result
of the strong demand to re-use existing and proven
system solutions when developing new vehicles, i.e. a
domain speciﬁc category. If a similar study of using
the architecture business cycle would be performed in
other particular domains it is reasonable to expect that
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more categories would need to be added besides the
seven original categories of forces.
4.5. Generalisation of the Case
We believe the presented method of capturing an
architecture business cycle by scenarios deﬁning a
subset of the software architecture is possible to
generalise beyond our case in the automotive domain.
We found the mapping of the feedback in the cycle
valuable in understanding the role of the architecture
in the development process and we expect this
understanding would be equally valuable for other
architectures studied.
The nature of the architecture business cycle
for a speciﬁc architecture make the cycles we
captured unlikely to generalise to other architectures or
organisations. However, some of the forces identiﬁed
in our case study may be similar also for other
automotive manufacturers with comparable products
operating in the same markets, most likely forces in
the following categories:
• Legal/contractual issues
The automotive domain is very regulated and the
OEM-supplier relationship does not vary much
between European companies. Also the OEM-end
customer relationship is very similar between car
brands on the same markets.
• Commercial/competitive pressures
Premium car manufacturers are competing for the
same customers on the same global market.
• Technical environment
Some automotive technology are de-facto
standards, such as CAN [10], and other is
deﬁned by legal requirements (e.g. diagnostics).
Similarly, we would expect that if identical
architectural decisions have been made by other
architects in other automotive companies, they would
assert the same inﬂuencing feedback on the original
forces according to the architecture business cycle.
The last generalisation we see is based on our
experiences with working with architecture business
cycle “as an initial guide to design and data collection”
[17]. We think the architecture business cycle worked
quite well in this respect and believe it would be useful
as a theoretical framework in the design of other case
studies and in the collection and organisation of the
data, even if some hands-on adaptations are needed.
5. Conclusions
There were several, both theoretical and practical,
beneﬁts resulting from our study:
From a research perspective we found that the
architecture business cycle worked very well in
deﬁning the context for the interviews. The cycle also
worked well as a guiding model to understand the
role of the architecture in the software development
process. So both the theoretical framework and the
interview methodology used in this case should be
possible to generalise for studies at other organisations.
However, when trying to capture the a
comprehensive architecture business cycle in a
single interview situation the answers we got were
too general to be of use to the organisation studied.
We therefore tried to capture a separate cycle for
a subset of the architecture, deﬁned by three major
architecture scenarios. Our conclusion is that these
scenarios in themselves have a set of forces and
feedback which could be described according to the
architecture business cycle.
The Electric and Electronic Systems Engineering
unit at Volvo Cars gained several beneﬁts from
participating in this study: The architects gained a
better understanding of how the identiﬁed forces
affected the decision process and the architecture
resulting from these decisions. The management at
the EESE unit discovered the architecture team may
not be fully utilised and as a result the organisation
increased the focus on strategic architecture issues in
management meetings. Finally ﬁndings in the study
indirectly inﬂuenced a subsequent re-organisation at
the EESE unit. We believe that studies at other
organisation could also gain similar beneﬁts.
Finally we ﬁnd that the architecture business cycle
is useful, not only in theory but also in practice,
in understanding the relationship between the will of
stakeholders, the architects, the decisions shaping that
architecture and how these decisions in turn affect the
stakeholders, as shown in this case study.
6. Future Work
The obvious follow up to this study would be to see
if the “more focus on strategic architecture issues in
management team meetings” and “the co-organisation
of architecture related disciplines into the Electrical
Systems Design department” had the intended results
of better utilising the architecture team.
One thought is to use the architecture business cycle
for predicting change, i.e. how would the feedback
cycle look like and how would the originating forces
be affected if a speciﬁc software architecture would be
introduced. A current example would be AUTOSAR in
the automotive industry. A ﬁrst attempt to do this can
be seen in [16], but to support this a study would need
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to investigate more scenarios of the architecture than
covered there.
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